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Introduction 
An increasing number of scholars, development 
practitioners, and environmental activists today present 
micro-institutional solutions as the remedy for 
renewable resource scarcities. Their arguments have 
helped to shift attention away from market and state 
oriented policies as the only two alternatives for 
development and environmental conservation (Anderson 
and Grove 1987, Ostrom 1990, and Ostrom, Schroeder 
and Wynne 1993). The fresh claims on behalf of the 
local (Chambers 1983, Korten 1986, Schmink and 
Wood 1992, Uphoff 1986), the indigenous (Cultural 
Survival 1993, Denslow and Padoch 1988, and Richards 
1985), and the "little community" (Hecht and Cockburn 
1990, Scott 1976, Wade 1988) represent a long overdue 
move. 
The growing focus on community institutions and 
indigenous voices recognizes the rupture between the 
interests of local populations, national governments 
and/or international institutions. But even more 
appropriately, the focus on the local marks a shift from 
the preoccupation with the centralized, over-arching, 
solutions of the past decades that failed to reverse, and 
may indeed have contributed to, environmental 
problems. The attention to local spaces and 
communities fundamentally changes the conversation 
on development and conservation. The ensuing study 
builds upon the insight in this literature by examining 
the relationship between group size and successful 
collective action. Contrary to conventional wisdom in 
the social sciences (Hardin, 1981; Olson, 1965), I 
question the presumption that smaller groups are likely 
to be more successful than larger groups. 
The study analyzes village van panchayats (forest 
management councils) in Almora district in the Indian 
Middle Himalayas. These community level councils, 
many of them in existence since the 1930s, help 
residents utilize and protect forest resources in 
accordance with rules they themselves craft and attempt 
to enforce. I first describe the process behind the birth 
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of van panchayats and resource use in 5 van panchayats. 
I then discuss some significant theoretical reasons why 
larger groups may be more successful in managing their 
forests. In examining the relationship between group 
size and collective action, the study makes two major 
departures from the norm. Much writing on collective 
action focuses on the internal dynamics of a group. This 
paper, rather, looks at the external dynamics -- relations 
of a group with other groups. Second, it draws a 
distinction between mobilizing a group for collective 
action and success in meeting the objectives of 
collective action. Using these two ideas, it constructs an 
argument to show how larger groups may be more 
successful than smaller ones. 
The Forest Panchayats of Kumaon 
A multiplicity of institutional forms occupies the 
terrain of resource management in Almora. Three 
distinct regimes can be identified -- 1) Reserved forests 
controlled by the Forest Department; 2) Civil forests 
managed by the Revenue Department, and 3) 
Community forests managed by village forest councils 
(van panchayats). The activities of van panchayats are 
the focus of the investigation. 
The history of the van panchayats in the Indian 
Himalayas can be traced to the intrusions of the colonial 
British state in the early 1800s. From this period 
onward, the British government curtailed progressively 
the area of forests under the control of local 
communities (Guha 1990: 44-5). At the same time it 
also enacted elaborate new rules specifying strict 
restrictions on lopping and grazing rights, prohibited 
the extension of cultivation, sought to regulate the use 
of fire that villagers believed led to higher grass 
production, increased the labor extracted from the 
villagers, and strengthened the number of official forest 
guards (Pant 1922). 
The new rules stirred villagers into widespread 
protest (Ballabh and Singh, 1988; KFGC, 1922: 2). 
The often violent protests by village communities 
19 
forced the government to appoint the Kumaon Forest 
Grievances Committee to look into the local 
disaffection. On the basis of the Committee's 
recommendations the government passed the Van 
Panchayat Act of 1931. This act empowered village 
communities to create Forest Councils and bring under 
their own control forest lands that were managed by the 
revenue department as Class I and Civil Forests. 
(According to Somanathan (1989) the Act only 
formalized the control many hill communities had 
exercised over their forests before the arrival of the 
British. Their informal institutions were called lattha 
panchayats. Lattha means a big stick, and the name 
evocatively denotes the power the local community held 
over its members.) 
Nearly 3,000 forest panchayats today formally 
control 35% of the hill forests in Kumaon. Of these, 
nearly 1,700 exist in Almora alone (Agrawal 1995: 51). 
The broad parameters that define the management 
practices of these institutions are laid down in the Van 
Panchayat Act. But residents also meet frequently to 
discuss the rules that will govern extraction of benefits 
from forests and create monitoring, sanctioning, and 
arbitration devices to resolve the majority of 
management questions at the local level (Agrawal, 
1994). They elect their leaders from within the 
community, select guards to enforce rules, fine rule 
breakers, manage finances, and often distribute earnings 
for the benefit of the community. 
Resources of the Panchayats 
The most significant products villagers traditionally 
harvest from their forests are fodder, fuel wood, animal 
bedding, organic manure, and construction timber. 
Figure 1 outlines the importance of forests in the 
agricultural and subsistence economy by tracing the 
links between forest products villagers harvest and the 
kinds of needs such products fill. It is obvious that 
forests are the cornerstone of subsistence in the hills, 
contributing critical inputs to each element of the 
subsistence economy -- the household, agricultural 
fields, and livestock rearing. In addition, panchayat 
forests containing chir pine (Pinus roxburghii) also 
yield resin for turpentine, a commercially valuable 
product. 
Forests in the Hill Subsistence Economy 
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The revenues from the forest products are used to 
monitor and guard the resources, and to meet operational 
expenses of the panchayat. In some cases, councils have 
also had sufficient surpluses to create communal goods 
for their villages such as school buildings, or common 
utensils used to cook food for the community during 
festive celebrations. 
Key Actors 
The forest councils are embedded in a web of social 
and administrative relationships. These relationships 
presume the patterns of influence laid down in the 
Forest Panchayat Act of 1931, as amended in 1976. The 
Act provides support for the van panchayats from the 
revenue and to the forest departments for rule 
enforcement and the maintenance of vegetation in the 
forests but it grants them only limited authority to 
enforce rules .1 In 197 6, the overall framework of rules 
within which councils operated became far stricter. 
Government officials assumed substantially higher 
control over the elected officials of the councils. In 
addition, new restrictions on day-to-day activities meant 
the councils could fine rule breakers only with the 
consent of the rule-breaker, or after securing the 
permission of higher level government officials. For 
major disputes they were required either to move the 
judiciary, or rely on aid from the officials of the revenue 
department. 
As a result, over the last two decades, those forest 
councils that have few local resources at their command 
have been plagued by rule infractions (Agrawal 1994). 
Their elected officials, lacking independent means to 
pursue court cases, and the requisite influence to move 
the officials of the revenue department, have often been 
helpless to enforce the rules they created. Asked in a 
meeting to list the four most important problems facing 
their panchayats, 30 forest council chiefs listed 
problems related to inadequate supervision and local 
rule-breaking and monitoring 68% of the time. In 
1 Ironically, it is the Indian state after independence 
that reduced the local authority of the panchayats even 
more than the colonial British state. Forestry and 
Revenue department officials, both groups felt that the 
Van Panchayat Act devolved too much authority on the 
villagers, and that the villagers had not been able to 
manage their forests well. In support of their arguments 
they pointed to cases where, they argued, locally 
powerful individuals had engaged in large scale felling 
and had been abetted in some cases by panchayat 
officials. Their arguments led the increased restrictions 
through amendments introduced to the Act in 1976. 
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contrast, problems related to low incomes of the 
panchayats were mentioned only 32% of the time.2 
At the same time, the officials of the revenue 
department who are supposed to help the panchayats 
must perform a host of other duties, including the 
maintenance of law and order, collection of taxes, and 
administration of various development projects. Most 
revenue department officials consider these duties to take 
priority over the tasks related to forest panchayats. For 
many forest panchayats, then, inadequate levels of 
enforcement and limited local resources are a major 
problem. 
The Case Studies 
Data on five forest councils form the basis for the 
ensuing discussion. All of them are located in the 
Dhauladevi Development Block of Almora District. 
They range in elevation from 1,100 to 2,000 meters; 
their forests lie between 1,400 and 2,100 meters. They 
are all close to motorable roads, and are thus more or 
less equally exposed to market forces. In all, about 25 
villages are located in the watershed of the river 
Jataganga in Dhauladevi development block of which 11 
possess their own community forests management 
councils .3 The rest depend on illegal harvests from the 
forests of their neighbors, and forests owned by the 
forest or the revenue department. The watershed 
represents the situation in most of the Kumaon region. 
Forest resources are scarce, and villages compete with 
each other for subsistence benefits from forests. 
While the selected forest panchayats and their 
settlements are situated within the same ecological and 
administrative divisions, they differ significantly on 
their size, organization, age, and resource endowments. 
2 The 30 chiefs of councils listed a total of 97 
problems. Of these 31 (32%) related to the low income 
of their council, 22 (23%) to inadequate support from 
higher level government officials, and 44 (45%) to local 
level rule infringements, and problems in monitoring 
and enforcement. 
3 The selected panchayats were chosen randomly out of 
the 11 villages that possess their own community 




Basic Statistics on the Five Dhauladevi Forest Panchayats 
Pokhri 
Area (ha) 37 
Cropped area (ha) 12 
Area of Van Panchayat (ha) 20 
Distance from road (km) 0.5 
Elevation (M) 1,100 
No. of households (1993) 10 
As Table 1 indicates, Pokhri and Tangnua are very 
small in area as well as number of households, and have 
formed their forest councils only recently. Kotuli and 
Bhagartola are relatively large. Kana, although it has a 
large aggregate area, still possesses only a small 
number of households. In Tangnua, the population has 
increased in the last two decades, but the number of 
households has remained more or less stable. 
The average annual number of meetings for Kana, 
Pokhri and Tangnua lies between two and four. For 
Kotuli and Bhagartola it ranges between 8 and 12. Data 
from the meeting records of the first three councils 
indicate that they have also been relatively lax in 
creating rules to guide user behavior, and ineffective in 
en.forcing the rules they have crafted. In part these 
differences among the five councils may simply indicate 
that because the first three panchayats are younger, their 
officials as well as members need more experience in 
working with government officials, in interacting with 
each other, and in forming and enforcing rules. 
Such an explanation would be simple and attractive. 
Further examination, however, reveals its invalidity, at 
least for the selected councils. Records for meetings of 
Tangnua Kana Kotuli Bhagar-
tola 
56 379 139 179 
14 230 36 59 
25 25 35 63 
0 0 0.5 1 
2,000 2,000 1,700 1,900 
21 25 50 70 
the Bhagartola and Kotuli forest councils reveal that 
they met regularly and often, and crafted a variety of 
rules right from the start. Their current organizational 
capacity certainly has developed over a period of time, 
but this does not mean that time is the explanatory 
variable for such capacity. 
A more favorable institutional and political-
economic climate in the earlier period that helped 
establish the authority of the older forest councils might 
still be playing a role in their continued survival and 
success. However, the current institutional environment 
has existed at least since 1976; perhaps, since Indian 
independence in 1950. It is difficult to accept that effects 
of a supportive environment have lingered on for 20 
years or more, when everything around these village 
councils has changed. Further, it is important to 
understand how the activities and the processes within 
the panchayats relate to the macro environment rather 
than simply leaving the explanation to the passage of 
time. 
A second difference that marks the first three 
councils is their low budget (see table 2). 
TABLE 2 
Basic Institutional Information on Forest Panchayats 
Pokhri Tangnua Kana Kotuli Bhargar-
tola 
Year of formation 1989 1988 1991 1962 1939 
Average no. meetings/year 2 4 4 8 12 
Total annual budget, 1990 (Rs) 300 500 670 1750 3800 
Per household contribution (Rs) 30 24 27 35 54 
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During the course of their existence, Kana, Polchin, 
and Tanguua have seldom been able to raise more than 
Rs. 750 a year (Rs. 30.00 equal one US dollar) to meet 
their expenses. Nor has their capacity to raise 
contributions from villagers increased during their 
existence. Kotuli and Bhagartola, however, routinely 
raise between Rs. 2,000 and 4,000. Higher aggregate 
and per-household contributions from member 
households increase the overall capacity of the councils 
to hire guards and enforce rules. Since guards are 
typically paid around Rs. 200.00 to 250.00 a month, 
the smaller councils cannot hire a full time guard for the 
more than three to four months in a year. 
To some extent, the ability of households to 
contribute to the forest councils relates back to the 
condition and type of vegetation in the forest itself, 
making conclusive assertions hazardous. If villagers 
receive little benefit from the forest, they will have 
little incentive to protect the forest. In a vicious cycle, 
then, the degraded condition of forest will worsen still 
further, discouraging future contributions. Too much, 
however, can be made of such a connection. In a 
condition of generalized poverty in the hills, where few, 
if any, of the households can be viewed as prosperous or 
even reasonably well-off, why do we find "institutional 
robustness" (Ostrom 1990) in some cases, and miss it 
in others? 
In the case of the forest panchayats the above 
explanation is simply off the mark. The per-capita 
forest area in all the panchayats is low, but no lower for 
the first three panchayats than for the Bhagartola and 
Kotuli, which are more successful. In addition, more 
than a third of the residents in all the five cases, 
including the less successful first three villages, 
initiated the process of forming the councils; most of 
the other villagers were willing to experiment. Villagers 
in all the five cases find significant proportions of their 
subsistence needs for fuelwood, fodder and construction 
timber in the panchayat's forests; and even in the 
smaller villages, there have been some contributions to 
the panchayat coffers. All this indicates that the 
problem is somewhat different from "vicious cycle" 
postulation. It is related more to the inability of small 
groups of poor households to generate a surplus for 
protecting commonly owned and managed resources, 
rather than to their unwillingness .4 
4 It should be obvious that even if the problem is one 
of a lack of incentive to contribute in the smaller 
communities, the larger argument of the paper holds --
smaller groups find it more difficult to successfully 
organize collective action. 
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Implications of the study 
The salient features of the situation can now be 
summarized. A number of forest panchayats compete 
with each other in incomes, high dependence on forests 
to protect and subsist on their scarce resources. While 
the per capita endowment of forest resources is similar 
across the panchayats, the smaller forest councils have 
somewhat unexpectedly been less successful in 
protecting their resources. 
The success of the larger panchayats is reflected in 
the greater number of meetings held each year, the more 
rules crafted, the larger budgets, the higher levels of 
monitoring and enforcement, and even a relatively more 
dense vegetation cover. The figures for the "total tree 
biomass" in table 3 provide some limited indication that 
the larger forest panchayats have been more successful 
in protecting their forests. 5 According to most 
writings that explore the relationship between collective 
action and group size, the probability of collective 
action becomes progressively bleaker as group size 
increases. The data on five forest councils indicate, 
however, that smaller groups may find it too arduous to 
create viable institutions that will persist over time to 
encourage collective actions, or to ensure member 
contributions to forest protection. 
5 Since the Kana, Pokhri, and Tangnua forest 
panchayats have formed recently, the condition of the 
vegetation in their forests, unlike the cases of Kotuli 
and Bhagartola, cannot entirely be attributed to the 
manner in which the panchayat has functioned. But the 
relatively lax enforcement of rules in the three 
panchayats implies there will be little improvement in 
the condition of the forest. 
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TABLE 3 
Tree Biomass in Investigated Cases 
Pokhri Tangnua Kana Kotuli Bhagartola 
Trees per Ha 1103 
Mean tree DBH (em) .1706 
Mean tree height (M) 7.1 
Total tree biomass (cuM/ha) 179 
No. of tree species 5 
No. of plots sampled 16 
Two reasons can explain the success of larger forest 
councils: each relates to protection of forests from 
unauthorized users and uses. To protect forests 
successfully from generalized pressure on resources, 
communities need guards who will enforce rules. But 
guards who will monitor the condition of forests and 
prevent rule infringements cannot be hired without a 
minimum level of surplus. The smaller communities of 
poor peasants find it difficult to contribute even the 
relatively modest amounts that are necessary to hire a 
guard. As group size increases, it becomes easier to 
organize a surplus and commit it to enforcement and 
monitoring. (Thompson 1977, Agrawal 1992). 
Second, smaller communities also find it more 
difficult to prevent residents of other villages from 
coming and breaking rules related to forest use. In any 
dispute with residents of other villages they command 
fewer resources.6 The problem becomes especially acute 
in the absence of adequate support from the revenue 
department and other higher authorities. If a village 
community cannot raise sufficient resources to hire a 
guard to detect and prevent rule infractions, it is 
unlikely to possess the resources needed either to 
influence higher level government officials, or to move 
the notoriously slow Indian judicial system to resolve 
disputes. Thus, on both counts, hiring a guard and 
influencing higher level enforcement mechanisms, 
smaller communities are disadvantaged? 
6 Voluntary labor and monetary contributions may 
both be necessary to discourage local rule infractions 
and resolve disagreements by arbitration or civil suits. 
7 For the selected cases, the per capita material 
endowments and forest resources are similar across the 
villages. Were there large disparities in the ability of 
individual households to make contributions for hiring a 
guard, or in the amount of forest resources they 
controlled, it is indeed possible that smaller villages 
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(Para/Gare) 
2104 182511160 2460 1826 
.1487 .117/.1423 .1646 .1572 
4.5 5.9/8.1 5.3 6.3 
166 116/149 301 205 
9 2317 13 11 
9 11/9 26 18 
The finding that relatively larger groups found it 
easier to protect their forests successfully permits us 
also to engage the impressive theoretical literature on 
the relationship between group size and the probability 
of collective action. Olson's seminal work points to the 
importance of group size itself in determining whether 
collective action will be undertaken. According to him, 
"unless the number of individuals in a group is quite 
small, or unless there is coercion or some other special 
device to make individuals act in their common interest, 
rational self-interested individuals will not act to achieve 
their common or group interests" (1965: 2, emphasis in 
original). Focusing on the internal dynamics of groups, 
Olson suggests, "the larger the group the farther it will 
fall short of providing an optimal supply of a collective 
good" (1965: 48). Following Olson's forceful emphasis 
on the rational, self-interested individual as the 
constituent unit of all groups, later studies also focused 
primarily on the individual and his relation to collective 
action. In the process, they have ignored the impact of 
external relationships of one group with other groups. 
The following discussion builds on existing studies 
of collective action by making two major points. It 
examines the external dynamics of a group with other 
groups; and second, it makes a distinction between the 
formation of a group and achieving the objective for 
which the group was formed. 
The logic in considering external dynamics is 
devastatingly simple, almost "tautological", as Hardin 
(19 81 : 3 8) characterizes part of 0 lson' s argument. 
Most villages in the hills already exist as groups. 
could protect their forests better than the larger villages. 
In selecting the watershed of the river Jataganga, where 
villages possess roughly similar resources per capita, 
the study controlled for the impact of large differences in 
per capita forests and incomes and permitted a focus on 
the major variable of interest-- group size. 
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Individuals are born into these groups. The choice they 
face, then, is not whether to join a group. Rather, they 
must choose to not join a group of which they are 
already members by birth. Their calculus is not about 
the costs of joining; rather, it is about how expensive it 
would be not to join. In this situation where individuals 
find it more costly to leave the group, rather than to 
join, it might seem obvious that larger groups turn out 
to be more successful in protecting and managing their 
resources. 
Larger groups are more successful in two senses. A 
group that gains in size as more villagers participate in 
its activities is better able to raise more resources and 
expend a greater monitoring and enforcement effort. 
Two, if there is a number of different groups, some 
larger than others, the larger groups are more likely to 
be successful. Both propositions in part rely on an 
added distinction between organizing collective action 
and success in achieving the objective of collective 
action. 
Most studies on collective action have, by default, 
assumed that success in organizing a group (or 
collective action), and success in achieving the objective 
for which the group (or collective action) is organized, 
are one and the same thing. Under many conditions, the 
distinction is unnecessary -- perhaps the reason why the 
obfuscation of this difference has survived for so long. 
But in the case of forest panchayats, successfully 
forming a group to protect village forest resources is a 
very different proposition from succeeding in protecting 
these resources. And while success in forming a group 
may come easier to smaller groups, success in 
protecting resources is easier for larger groups. What we 
should note is that successful collective action is not 
just about forming groups, it is about being successful 
in achieving the objective for which the group was 
formed. 
If it is true that as group size increases, the 
likelihood of successful collective action may also 
increase, a natural question arises: "Would continued 
growth in size lead to lower likelihood of success at 
some point?" The exact point at which increasing group 
size would lead to higher coordination costs, however, 
depends on the context in which groups operate (See 
Buchanan and Tullock, 1962). In the context of the 
uneven topography of the Indian Himalayas, where 
natural factors such as limited availability of water, 
arable land and forests constrain the growth of villages, 
the costs of coordination in existing villages are 
unlikely to become extremely high. Most villages 
comprise less than 200 households. One can then 
hypothesize the following: In small, similar, 
communities of poor users who use common pool 
resources for subsistence, the likelihood of successful 
collectlVe action to protect local resources increases as 
group size mcreases. It may however, decline as group 
size becomes very large and creates extremely high costs 
of coordination. 
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The latter part of the hypothesis is based on the 
existing literature on collective action rather than on the 
data from the studied cases which provide only indirect 
indication of what would happen to the likelihood of 
collective action as group size becomes extremely large. 
It is because costs of coordination would be very high 
for groups that are highly dispersed that smaller villages 
are unable to join each other to form larger forest 
management councils. For example, Kana, Pokhri and 
Tangnua are more than six kilometers away from each 
other. Very high costs of coordination form a 
significant obstacle preventing their attempts to form a 
joint management council. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, it may be useful to point to some 
practical relevance of the research. The findings reported 
here draw significance from the most recent trends in 
Indian forest policy .8 In a number of statements issued 
between 1988 and 1995, the federal Indian government 
and the governments of 15 Indian provinces have sought 
to increase local participation in the management of 
Indian forests (SPWD 1992, Sarin 1995). These Joint 
Forest Management statements constitute a break from 
the colonial forest policy. Yet the changes introduced 
today are far more timid than the British Forest 
Panchayat Act of 1931 (Agrawal, 1995b). Most state 
policy statements allow local populations only a partial 
share in the benefits from protecting forests and do not 
permit them a voice in crafting the rules whereby the 
forests would be managed (SPWD 1992, GOI 1992, 
1993). Without adequate support from enforcement 
officials, and without local enforcement capacity to 
ensure adequate protection -- two provisions that are 
mostly absent from the pronouncements of the Joint 
Forest Management policies--prospects of success for 
the new policy remain bleak, especially when conflicts 
arise.9 
In addition, the research indicates that where groups 
are very small and compete for a share in local 
resources, their performance in protecting resources may 
improve if government policies create institutional 
incentives for smaller groups to join together. The 
attempts of very small groups of the poor to protect 
local resources may founder because of limited capacity 
to raise a surplus to enable effective local monitoring 
and enforcement. Finally, if small groups are also 
highly dispersed, the external conditions might make it 
8 A number of governments in South Asia, including 
Nepal and Bhutan, are attempting to craft co-
management programs with village communities for 
more effective forest use and protection. 
9 The Indian central and state governments, in 
formulating the new forest policy statements, seem, 
thus, to have ignored the lessons that the history of the 
forest councils offers. 
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very difficult to create institutions through which they 
would coordinate their resource management and 
protection activities. 
The relevance of the research for India is evident in 
the context of a declining forest base and changing 
forest policies. The research is also significant in the 
emerging international debate over the criticality of 
local communities and indigenous institutions in 
managing forests. The example of the forest 
communities in the Indian Himalayas suggests that 
autonomy for local communities must be supplemented 
by arrangements that will help protect local resources 
by creatmg user groups that are not too small, and will 
encourage dispute resolution within the same 
community and among users from different 
communities. 
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